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SECURITY POLICIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL STADIA 
ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA
* 
Introduction 
Research on football violence has continually grown since the late 1960s in Britain and, later 
on, in many European countries. Yet, despite the diversity of their epistemological origins and 
approaches, academic explanations of the phenomenon have scarcely gone beyond the analysis 
of football supporters’ behaviour. Focusing thus on a sole aspect of the issue, scholars have 
practically excluded from their work all themes related to the control of football crowd disorder. 
Hence, the regulation of the phenomenon, the modes of its policing as well as the embedding of 
counter-hooliganism policies in the broader field of security have drawn little attention among 
European scholars. 
This low level of academic interest in the conception and implementation of counter-
hooliganism policies has severely hampered our understanding of the social interactions and 
dynamics that lie beneath the development of the phenomenon in Europe. But, most of all, it has 
practically blotted out the fact that the implementation of these policies has led to the increasing 
infringement of football supporters’ civil rights and liberties, owing to the introduction of an 
expanding network of control devices that target both criminal and deviant behaviour. Going 
from electronic surveillance, inside and outside of football stadia, to the collection and exchange 
of intelligence on known and suspected hooligans, this control of deviance has been further 
enhanced by the introduction of football bans that impose serious restraints on the freedom of 
movement of a person in the absence of a criminal conviction for a football-related offence.
1 
Presently applied in many European countries,
2 football bans imposed upon suspected hooligans 
have been extensively used since the 2000 European Championship.  
Lately, some British scholars have denounced the infringement of English football supporters’ 
civil rights and liberties through the enforcement of football banning orders and called into 
question the legal grounds of these measures.
3 While sharing their criticism, this paper argues 
                                                 
* Anastassia Tsoukala is a Maître de Conférences (Senior Lecturer) at Paris XI University and a Research 
Fellow at GEPECS, Paris V University. 
1 In such cases, football bans are not imposed by a court on conviction. They are imposed either by the 
executive or by a court on complaint from a senior police officer. In both instances, they may have 
domestic or international effects (or both). Domestic football bans make it a criminal offence to attend 
designated football matches for a determined period. Usually, a person subject to a ban has to attend a 
police station when these matches are taking place but may also have to comply with additional 
requirements. For instance, he may be banned from using public transport on match days or from visiting 
town centres, pubs and bars during risk periods. International football bans prevent a person from leaving 
the country by imposing the surrender of his/her passport during designated football matches or 
tournaments. In the UK, football banning orders introduced by the Football (Disorder) Act of 2000 
combine the effect of domestic and international football bans. 
2 These namely include Belgium, Italy, Germany, France and the UK.  
3 See G. Pearson, “Qualifying for Europe? The Legitimacy of Football Banning Orders ‘On Complaint’ 
under the Principle of Proportionality”, Entertainment & Sports Law Journal, Vol. 3, No. 1 (2005) 
(http://www.warwick.ac.uk/eslj); see also C. Stott and G. Pearson, “Football Banning Orders, 
Proportionality, and Public Order Policing”, The Howard Journal, Vol. 45, No. 3 (2006), pp. 241-54. 2 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
that, far from revealing a recent change in the control of football spectator violence, football 
bans are embedded in a security dispositif
4 that has been violating football supporters’ rights and 
liberties all over Europe since the mid-1980s. The forms and the importance of the control of 
deviance within this security dispositif have been studied elsewhere.
5 In this paper, the issue is 
addressed in relation to showing that this jeopardising of freedoms for the sake of security is not 
a side-effect of counter-hooliganism policies. It is inherent to the very structure of the regulation 
of the phenomenon in that it stems from the rationale of the crime control patterns that frame it 
and from the consequent dichotomy between the individual-based legal protection of freedom 
and group-based, risk-focused social control. 
To highlight these interactions, this paper reviews counter-hooliganism regulatory texts, adopted 
during the last four decades by national,
6 EU and European
7 institutions, in the light of the 
evolution of crime control policies in Europe. In so doing, the paper focuses on the tension 
between security policies and freedoms, setting aside the question of the development of long-
term preventative projects in several European countries since the early 1980s. Following the 
criterion of the changes undergone by the normative precision of the phenomenon, this period 
will be divided into three phases, respectively called general regulation, normative specificity 
and normative vagueness.  
1. General  regulation 
From the late 1960s to 1985, despite the increasing frequency and dangerousness of violent 
football-related incidents and the ensuing rise in moral panics,
8 football hooliganism was seen 
as an ordinary public order problem, the control of which did not require the introduction of 
specific laws. In continental Europe, the punishment of football hooligans relied on the 
provisions of national penal codes, while in England and Wales it was based on many common 
law and statutory offences, provided by acts dealing with the protection of public order in 
general.  
The same indulgence prevailed at the EU level where football hooliganism led to the adoption 
of only one Resolution by the European Parliament, in 1984, the authors of which mainly 
                                                 
4 According to M. Foucault, a dispositif is a heterogeneous set of discourses, institutions, architectural 
arrangements, regulations, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophic propositions, 
morality and philanthropy that forms an intensified surveillance and control mechanism. 
5 See A. Tsoukala, Sport et violence. L'évolution de la politique criminelle à l'égard du hooliganisme en 
Angleterre et en Italie, 1970-1995, Athens/Brussels: Sakkoulas/Bruylant (1995) ; see also by the same 
author, « La gestion policière du hooliganisme: Angleterre, Italie, Pays-Bas », in J.-C. Basson (ed.), Sport 
et ordre public, Paris: IHESI/La Documentation française (2001), pp. 159-74, and « Le hooliganisme et la 
protection de la sécurité intérieure en Europe. Quels enjeux ? », Revue internationale de criminologie et 
de police technique et scientifique, 3 (2002), pp. 310-22, and « Les nouvelles politiques de contrôle du 
hooliganisme en Europe : de la fusion sécuritaire au multipositionnement de la menace », Cultures & 
Conflits, No. 51 (2003), pp. 83-96. 
6 The national level covers all European countries that have been liberal democracies with a persistent 
football hooliganism problem for the major part of the last four decades. 
7 The European institutions include the Council of Europe and the Union of European Football 
Associations (UEFA).  
8 On the moral panics orchestrated by the British mass media since the 1966 Football World Cup, see G. 
Whannel, “Football, Crowd Behaviour and the Press”, Media, Culture and Society, 1 (1979), pp. 327-42. 
See also P. Murphy, J. Williams and E. Dunning, Football on Trial, London: Routledge (1990), p. 73 f; 
and also I. Taylor, “Class, Violence and Sport: The case of soccer hooliganism in Britain”, in H. Cantelon 
and R. Gruneau (eds), Sport, Culture and the Modern State, Toronto: University of Toronto Press (1982), 
pp. 39-96. SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL STADIA | 3 
recommended the strengthening of the control of football spectators through the enhancement of 
cooperation between all competent state and sports agents.
9  
That greatly-expanded regulatory stance probably suggests the existence of a common 
conceptual basis that arguably echoes the influence of the crime control regime that had been 
predominant in Europe until then. Widespread since the 19
th century, this regime was structured 
around the subjective aspects of the offence, i.e. the motive and the needs of the offender. What 
D. Garland qualifies as “penal welfarism”
10 went beyond the punishment of the individual fault 
to project itself into the future, seeking rehabilitation at the individual level and prevention at 
the collective one. At the former level, it was widely admitted that it was possible to exercise an 
influence on incarcerated criminals to make them comply with the looked-for norms of 
behaviour, i.e. to turn them into those “docile bodies” described by Foucault.
11 At the collective 
level, the wish to control the social origins of delinquency led to the introduction of many long-
term preventive programmes. 
In any case, this belief in the capacity of society to control the sources of crime – through the 
change of the delinquent persons or of the crime-generating aspects of their environment (or 
both) – was built upon a series of clear-cut distinctions. First, there was a conceptual distinction 
between delinquency and deviance, according to which only the former could set into motion 
the criminal justice system. Far from implying the absence of any control of deviance, this 
distinction was actually limiting this control in terms of the exercise of executive power. 
Second, there was a temporal distinction, according to which the criminal justice system was 
usually activated after the perpetration of the offence. Social reaction to the offence was then 
ideally seen as a defence against the transgression of the norm, as protection from any future 
transgression perpetrated by the same person, and as dissuasion towards any person wishing to 
commit a similar transgression. Lastly, distinctions were made among the objects of crime 
control policies, according to which social control was mainly targeting criminals who were 
thought to pose a threat to the rest of the community precisely because of behaviour that was 
negating one or more social values put under the protection of the law.  
Although this crime control policy had been called into question since the 1970s, its rationale 
went on determining the regulation of football hooliganism at the national and EU levels until 
1985. Yet at the European level its influence could be seen to wane as shown by the provisions 
of the Council of Europe Recommendation No. R (84) 8 on the reduction of spectator violence 
at sporting events and in particular at football matches, adopted in 1984. While recommending 
the enhancement of national coercive policies, the authors of that Recommendation attached 
priority to the strengthening of cooperation between the competent state and civil agents and 
proposed the introduction of a situational preventive policy, structured around the segregation 
and the surveillance of football spectators.
12  
Recommendation No. R (84) 8 has no binding effect. It nevertheless marks a turning point in the 
regulation of football hooliganism in that its aforementioned provisions prefigure the emergence 
of a new era of social control, based on risk management. Yet it should also be noted that 
situational prevention was already prevalent in UEFA’s binding instructions in 1983,
13 which 
                                                 
9 Refer to European Council, Resolution on Sport in the Community, OJ C 127, 14.5.1984, F§3. 
10 See D. Garland, Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies, Aldershot: Gower (1985). 
11 See M. Foucault, Surveiller et punir, Paris: Gallimard (1975), p. 135 f.  
12 Refer to Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (84) 8, Recommendations to Member States, 
Strasbourg (1985), B§4. 
13 See UEFA, Order and security in the stadia, Binding instructions and recommendations to avoid crowd 
disturbances, Bern (1983). 4 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
had been set up in cooperation with the English Football Association and the Deutscher 
Fussball-Bund. It thus seems that, in the case of football hooliganism, the change in crime 
control policy had initially occurred in the private sphere, as the outcome of concerted action by 
sports organisations and public security agencies, to be further specified at the international 
level, following an intergovernmental rather than parliamentary route of action. In this respect, 
the Heysel stadium disaster,
14 which is often seen as the tragic event that led to a new era in the 
control of football hooliganism in Europe, merely accelerated a change that was already 
underway.  
2. Normative  specificity 
Undoubtedly, the Heysel disaster has had a deep impact on the perception of football 
hooliganism in Europe. The images of the dying victims made so obvious the danger of the 
phenomenon that henceforth it has been taken for granted that its control should rely on an 
appropriate legal framework. It was to signify the beginning of a new period, from 1985 to the 
late 1990s, in the course of which football hooliganism acquired, to some extent, a normative 
specificity. 
2.1  The framing of football hooliganism 
Given the prior trends, it is not surprising that this normative specificity first appeared at the 
European level, in the adoption in 1985 of the European Convention on Spectator Violence and 
Misbehaviour at Sports Events and in particular at Football Matches.
15 Set up in the aftershock 
of the Heysel disaster, the European Convention did not promote any genuinely new policy as it 
essentially reproduced the main provisions of the aforementioned Recommendation.
16 
Consequently, the European Convention attaches priority to the enhancement of domestic and 
international cooperation among all competent public agencies and sports authorities,
17 and calls 
for the implementation of a situational preventive policy, always structured around the 
segregation and the surveillance of football spectators. From that point onwards, however, this 
preventive policy has been expanding in time, to cover periods running before the start and after 
the end of the fixture, expanding in space, to cover places outside of football stadia, and 
expanding in relation to its target populations, to cover potential troublemakers and persons who 
are under the influence of alcohol or drugs.
18  
On this last point, the European Convention differs significantly from the aforementioned 
Recommendation, the provisions of which solely refer to known troublemakers. In so doing, it 
allowed the institutionalisation of the control of deviance for the first time. This highly 
unexpected position, in that it came from an institution that aims at protecting human rights in 
Europe, was reinforced and enlarged by UEFA, which, in its 1985 guidelines made in 
conjunction with an expert group set up by the Council of Europe,
19 also provided for security 
measures to be implemented against potential troublemakers. Since then, social control has gone 
                                                 
14 In May 1985, a riot in Heysel stadium during the European Cup finals resulted in 39 deaths and more 
than 400 injuries. 
15 See the Council of Europe, European Convention on Spectator Violence and Misbehaviour at Sports 
Events and in particular at Football Matches, CETS No. 120, signed in Strasbourg on 19.08.95 and which 
entered into force on 1.11.95. 
16 For an analysis of these provisions, see A. Tsoukala (1995), op. cit., p. 213 f.  
17 International cooperation is now thoroughly regulated. 
18 Refer to the European Convention on Spectator Violence, op. cit., Art. 3. 
19 See J. Taylor, “The War on Soccer Hooliganism: The European Convention on Spectator Violence and 
‘Misbehaviour’ at Sports Events”, Virginia Journal of International Law, 27 (1987), p. 644. SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL STADIA | 5 
beyond the response to the effective prejudice provoked by a delinquent act in additionally 
covering the potential threat posed by deviant behaviours.  
This expansion of social control has coincided with claims to toughen the punishment of 
football hooligans. The member state signatories to the European Convention thus have the task 
of ensuring that those found guilty of offences related to football violence receive appropriate 
penalties or administrative measures.
20 Actually, it is this call for the hardening of the coercive 
measures that has given rise to all subsequent counter-hooliganism laws, which usually seek to 
warrant the application of the European Convention at the national level. Varying significantly 
from one country to another as to their number, content and dates of enactment, these counter-
hooliganism laws, which are further reinforced by many specific measures provided by laws 
with a general scope, end up endowing football hooliganism with a certain normative 
specificity. A summing-up of the key definitional elements put forward by European legislators 
shows that the incriminating behaviour consists of 
a)  abusive acts or words, involving the use or threat of violence, which cause harm to a 
person or damage to property or breach of the peace, if they are committed or pronounced 
by one or more persons at or in connection with sports events; and  
b)  ordinary acts that are reprehensible if committed at or in connection with sports events.
21  
The creation of this specific counter-hooliganism legal framework has had a significant effect 
on the control of football spectators in that it implies the introduction of dispensatory measures 
and new sanctions. Among the former, the most important ones are the alcohol ban inside and 
around football stadia in the case of high-risk football matches, the use of various surveillance 
devices inside and outside of football stadia, and the preventive detention of potential 
troublemakers. Among the new sanctions, the most important ones are the domestic and 
international football bans.  
Yet, this normative specificity of football hooliganism remains paradoxical because it has been 
developed in the absence of any legal definition of the phenomenon. Actually, football 
hooliganism is decomposed into a series of reprehensible behaviours, adopted at or in 
connection with sports events. Therefore, the spatial criterion is both the key definitional 
element of football hooliganism and the ground of a new aggravating circumstance as persons 
committing offences in connection with sports events are punished more severely than are 
persons committing similar offences in other circumstances. 
The adoption of such an analytical approach, which brings to mind the definitional difficulties 
met by jurists during their multiple attempts to frame the notion of organised crime,
22 suggests 
that football hooliganism is a commonsensical notion that can only be used as a generic term.
23 
The problems raised by this impossibility to transcribe in legal terms an empirical notion are 
related to the drawing of a clear line between legality and illegality and to the ensuing 
positioning of persons in the ongoing renegotiation of the power given to the social control 
                                                 
20 Refer to the European Convention on Spectator Violence, op. cit., Art. 3c. 
21 Such acts include consumption of alcohol in and around football stadia or, in some countries, 
possession of intoxicating liquor while travelling to or from a designated sporting event. 
22 See C. Blakesley, «  Les systèmes de justice criminelle face au défi du crime organisé  », Revue 
Internationale de Droit Pénal, 1/2 quarters (1998), pp. 35-68; see also R. Ottenhof, « Le crime organisé : 
de la notion criminologique à la notion juridique », in Institut de Sciences Pénales et de Criminologie, 
Criminalité organisée et ordre dans la société, Marseille: Presses Universitaires d’Aix (1997), pp. 45-48. 
23 A comment made by C. Blakesley (1998, op. cit., p. 41) on defining organised crime is paraphrased 
here. 6 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
apparatus. In other words, while some behaviours undeniably fall under the law,
24 the legal 
definition of some other behaviours, situated on the borderline of (il)legality, in a grey zone 
made of deviant rather than delinquent acts,
25 is closely related to the discretionary power of the 
state or civil security agents (or both). Therefore, it can vary significantly from one context to 
another, according to the service, the grade or even the mood of the security agents in charge,
26 
or according to the alleged degree of danger associated with the fixture or to the dominant 
crowd control patterns in a given area, thus creating a zone of legal uncertainty. The vague 
definition of public order and thus what may breach it jeopardises not only the ideally equal 
implementation of the law in a given territory but also the protection of civil rights and liberties 
in that the consequent weakening of the principle of legality entails that of the principle of 
proportionality and in some cases the principle of accountability. As the phenomenon to be put 
under control is not clearly defined by the legislator, the state and civil security agents can 
include in their field of action a potentially infinite series of behaviours. Control and 
surveillance devices can be developed beyond any possible assessment of their correspondence 
with the key elements of the incriminated behaviour or of their proportionality to the football 
hooliganism threat. This potentially unlimited extension of the social control realm renders 
targeted populations very vulnerable, as the blurring of the frontiers between legality and 
illegality makes it practically impossible to call into question the intrusive power of security 
agents. Contrary then to appearances, which rest upon the quantitatively important national 
legislative outputs, the legal framework related to football hooliganism is in fact delimited by 
the executive rather than the legislative power, thus leaving football spectators exposed to the 
arbitrariness of the social control apparatus. 
2.2  Values to be protected 
This prevalence of the executive in the regulation of football hooliganism has further produced 
an implicit prioritisation of the values to be protected, according to which protection of people 
and property rank first. By contrast, the protection of democratic order, breached by the 
increasingly frequent adoption of racist behaviour inside football stadia, did not emerge as an 
important value until the 1990s, at the national level, and it would take more than a decade for it 
to impose itself at the European level as well.
27  
Actually, this turning of security into a prime value to protect has not been specific to the 
counter-hooliganism fight. It is one of the key features of the evolution of the European political 
agenda during that period.
28 Indeed, concerns have been raised since the mid-1980s about what 
                                                 
24 Such behaviours include bodily harm and damage to property. 
25 These types of acts would include standing up often and/or vociferating (inside stadia), drinking 
alcohol or being part of a boisterous group (outside of stadia).  
26 See D.H. Bayley, Patterns of Policing: A comparative international analysis, New Brunswick: Rutgers 
University Press (1985); see also D. Monjardet, Ce que fait la police. Sociologie de la force publique, 
Paris: La Découverte (1996); and also C. Mouhanna, « La police de proximité ou les contradictions d’une 
police au service du public », Panoramiques, No. 33 (1998), pp. 27-32. On the football hooliganism case, 
see M. O’Neill, “Policing football in Scotland”, International Review for the Sociology of Sport, Vol. 39, 
No. 1 (2004), pp. 95-104 and also C. Stott, “Police expectations and the control of English soccer fans at 
Euro 2000”, Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, Vol. 26, No. 4 
(2003), pp. 640-55.  
27 Following the Political Declaration and the General Conclusions adopted by the European Conference 
against Racism and Intolerance (held in Bratislava on 13 October 2000), the Council of Europe adopted in 
July 2001 the Recommendation Rec(2001)6 on the prevention of racism, xenophobia and racial 
intolerance in sport. 
28 For an analysis of the key aspects of this process, see O. Waever, “Securitization and Desecuritization”, 
in R. Lipshutz (ed.), On Security, New York: Columbia University Press (1995), pp. 46-86; see also M. SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL STADIA | 7 
is perceived as a globally rising disorder – mainly owing to the acceleration of the 
Europeanisation process, the end of bipolarity, the growth of transnational migratory 
movements, globalisation, the rise in environmental and alimentary insecurity, and the 
tremendous technological and scientific progress. Against this background the politicisation of 
security has relied on the redefinition of both the security threats and the object of social 
control, according to two distinct but interconnected patterns, related respectively to the end of 
bipolarity and to the emergence of the risk society. In the former case, the vacuum produced by 
the vanishing of the Soviet enemy was filled by a new perception of security threats, focused on 
delinquent persons. This substitution of the political threat for the criminal one had already been 
underway in the mid-1980s, when numerous official reports and public discourses on internal 
security issues sought to define threats by establishing a close association between various 
deviant and criminal behaviours, ranging from terrorism and organised crime to illegal 
immigration, juvenile delinquency, petty crime, urban violence and football hooliganism. The 
end of bipolarity accelerated and, above all, amplified this process, thus leading to the 
construction of a European-wide security continuum
29 that focused on the very existence of any 
threat posed to the internal security of European countries, regardless of its effective danger and 
legal nature. Henceforth, threats have been thought to be interconnected and deterritorialised 
as, owing to their alleged transnational nature, they are not exclusively external or internal 
anymore. Consequently, they are subject to a dual definitional process. On the one hand, their 
contour is not clear-cut, enabling them to become part of a broader set of disparate threats. On 
the other hand, their hard core has become increasingly specific, justifying without any possible 
doubt their inscription in the security threats realm. In other words, each of the phenomena 
included or to be included in the security threats continuum has become a specific threat, 
following the criminalisation or harsher punishment of some of its aspects or even control of its 
deviant characteristics, while simultaneously becoming a general threat, owing to the absence of 
any delimitation of the threat itself. The parallel development of these two definitions has 
granted the social control apparatus potentially infinite possibilities of expansion in the name of 
the efficient protection of internal security in Europe. 
The establishment of this dual definition of security threats has been greatly facilitated by the 
rise of post-modern risk societies.
30 As is widely acknowledged today, this concern with risk 
and the ensuing introduction of strategies for coping with it have had a deep impact on the 
conception and implementation of crime control policies. As a result, the defenders of the risk-
focused mentality
31 call into question the principle of rehabilitation to promote the introduction 
of a realist social-control policy. In so doing, they deny the pertinence of any causal link 
between crime and social environment to limit themselves to the mere control of the social 
effects of crime through a constant assessment of benefits and costs. It should be specified here 
that this focus on risk has not led to the abandonment of the rehabilitation-oriented crime 
                                                                                                                                               
Anderson,  Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World, Cambridge: Polity Press 
(1996); and also B. Buzan, O. Waever and J. de Wilde, Security: A New Framework for  Analysis, 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Riener (1998); and S. Palidda, «  Polizia e immigrati: un’analisi etnografica  », 
Rassegna Italiana di Sociologia, 1 (1999), pp. 77-114; and P. Mary and T. Papatheodorou (eds), Crime et 
insécurité en Europe, Bruxelles: Bruylant (2001); and D. Bigo, “Security and Immigration: Toward a 
Critique of the Governmentality of Unease”, Alternatives, Vol. 27, No. 5 (2002), pp. 63-92; and H. 
Lagrange, Demandes de sécurité, Paris: Seuil (2003), p. 53 f. 
29 See D. Bigo, Polices en réseaux, Paris: Presses de Sciences Po (1996), ch. V. 
30 See U. Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, London: Sage (1992). 
31 Actually, the process of redefining the object of social control had been initiated in the 1970s in the US. 
For a brief, concise history of the emergence of this trend, see M. Feeley, “Crime, social order and the 
rise of neo-Conservative politics”, Theoretical Criminology, Vol. 7, No. 1 (2003), p. 118 f. 8 | ANASTASSIA TSOUKALA 
control policy. It has rather provided prior mentalities and practices with a new meaning, so 
they can fit into the context of a risk-based way of thinking.
32 Therefore, while formally 
speaking, certain measures continue to be inspired by the previous crime control model and 
others follow the risk-focused one, the risk-based mindset has in fact been gradually taking 
over.
33 
The rationale of this risk-focused crime control policy disrupts the prior one in many respects. 
First, its main objective, i.e. the protection of the community from all risks posed to its security, 
wipes away the distinction between deviance and delinquency. The social control apparatus no 
longer seeks to defend the community against a danger stemming from an offence, but to protect 
it from the potential risk included in a given behaviour. Its field of action can thus cover both 
deviant and criminal behaviours. Subsequently, the control of deviance ceases to be an 
exceptional, dispensatory expression of social control and becomes a key element of the norm, 
which cannot be dissociated from the very functioning of the crime control system. Actually, 
that shift calls into question the whole conception of the criminal justice system in democracy. 
The institutionalisation of the control of deviance is so wide that it is no longer possible to 
reason in terms of specific swings from a liberal social-control apparatus to one that is more 
authoritarian in orientation. We are no longer in front of the isolated drifts of a criminal justice 
system otherwise conforming to the rule of law, which was analysed at length in the 1980s.
34 
Presently, the growing grip of the social control apparatus over the private sphere is formally 
established and legitimised. Indeed, while the defenders of human rights see in this shift the 
symptom of an ongoing redefinition of the power relations between the executive and the people 
or the (re)positioning of the state and civil agents in the political and security fields (or both), 
the executive branch refuses to see in it any jeopardising of civil rights and liberties. Assuming 
that the law, as rule related to what is owed to the community rather than to persons, aims at 
protecting the common good,
35 it legitimises the expansion of the social control apparatus as a 
necessary adaptation to a new context in the name of protecting the security of democratic 
regimes from all present and future risks.
36 At the same time, the mere expansion of the social 
control apparatus beyond the limits posed by democratic regimes does not suffice to announce 
the emergence of an authoritarian state in the strict sense of the term. However important they 
may be, the infringements of civil rights and liberties that result from this reconfiguration of the 
citizens–law relationship do not radically alter the basis of political order in European countries. 
What they do reveal is a deep change in the grounding of the legal order in democracy, which 
has been enlarged to include in a permanent way normative propositions stemming from an 
extra-legal normative order. That ends up alienating one of the key elements of the rule of law, 
i.e. the protection offered to people against the arbitrariness of the state apparatus.  
The risk-focused crime control policy also rests upon a deep change of its object. It no longer 
targets delinquent persons but members of allegedly risk-producing groups. Therefore, it goes 
beyond effectively perpetrated offences to cover the potential behaviours of members of deviant 
                                                 
32 See C. Shearing, “Punishment and the changing face of the governance”, Punishment & Society, Vol. 3, 
No. 2 (2002), p. 212. 
33 See M. Hörnqvist, “The birth of public order policy”, Race & Class, Vol. 46, No. 1 (2004), p. 39. 
34 See M. Delmas-Marty, Modèles et Mouvements de Politique Criminelle, Paris: Economica (1983), p. 
102 f. 
35 See M. Bastit, Naissance de la loi moderne, Paris: PUF (1990), p. 370. 
36 On the legitimising of new security policies, see A. Tsoukala, “Democracy Against Security: The 
Debates about Counter-terrorism in the European Parliament, September 2001–June 2003”, Alternatives, 
Vol. 29, No. 4 (2004), pp. 417-39; see also by the same author “Democracy in the Light of Security. 
British and French Political Discourses on Domestic Counterterrorism Policies”, Political Studies, Vol. 
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groups. Yet, this shift from the individual to the collective level jeopardises the grounds of 
democratic legal frameworks that rely, on the one hand, on the principles of legality and 
personal liability and, on the other hand, on the relation between the offender and the individual 
or collective victim.
37 More explicitly, the pretension of social control agents to possess a kind 
of global knowledge of future behaviours denies a person the freedom to decide whether, and 
under what circumstances, s/he will commit a given act; it goes on to deny the moral assessment 
of that act as the basis of a liability that entails punishment and, finally, to deny the role of the 
victim in the justification of punishment. Hereafter, the hazardous nature of the elements of the 
triangular relation of offender–offence–punishment is put aside for the benefit of a determinist 
vision of the world that, in search of certainties, ends up blurring the frontiers between ordinary 
and reprehensible behaviour. Since danger is an individual concept, while risk cannot but be a 
collective one, the social control apparatus does not seek to punish delinquent persons in the 
name of the dangerousness of their acts, but to control social groups according to the 
seriousness of the alleged risks they pose to the community.
38 The control of these groups 
follows the proactive principle of actuarial risk-assessment, while the selection of its target 
populations mirrors at any given moment the temporary result of the struggles over the 
definition of security threats occurring within the political and security realms, which in turn 
echo the values and interests of each group of actors involved in this process. Once prevailing, 
the implementation of the proactive principle of actuarial risk-assessment implies the 
introduction or the development of various security devices that create a continuum of control
39 
covering delinquent persons, potentially delinquent persons and even persons a priori irrelevant 
to the behaviour put under control. In the case of football hooliganism, CCTV cameras installed 
in football stadia, for instance, cover the behaviour of troublemakers, boisterous football 
supporters and ordinary football spectators, while the collection and exchange of intelligence 
goes well beyond the limits of the known and potential troublemakers to cover even ordinary 
spectators wishing to attend an international tournament.
40  
Nevertheless, the ensuing infringements of civil rights and liberties are not the mere effects of 
this continuum. They are, above all, the outcome of the very logic lying beneath the risk-
focused crime control policy. Indeed, since the legal protection of civil rights and liberties is, by 
definition, individual,
41 the shift from a person to a group as the key object of social control 
cannot but weaken the scope of this protection, which in a certain way henceforth becomes 
objectless. In other words, the framework for the legal protection of freedom still rests upon an 
individual logic, linked to the principles of the prior rehabilitation-oriented policy, while the 
framework for risk-based social control has moved on to a collective logic that, in the absence 
                                                 
37 On the vanishing of the victim–offender dichotomy, see the comments of C. Shearing (2001), op. cit., 
p. 208. 
38 See A. De Giorgi, Zero tolleranza. Strategie e pratiche della società di controllo, Rome: Derive 
Approdi (2000); see also C. Shearing (2001), op. cit., pp. 203-20; and E. Silver and L. Miller, “A 
Cautionary Note on the Use of Actuarial Risk Assessment Tools for Social Control”, Crime & 
Delinquency, Vol. 48, No. 1 (2002), pp. 138-61. 
39 See M. Feeley and J. Simon, “The new penology: Notes on the emerging strategy of corrections and its 
implications”, Criminology, 30 (1992), p. 459. 
40 On the expansion of the surveillance and control dispositif in risk-focused societies, see R. Jones, 
“Digital rule: Punishment, control and technology”, Punishment & Society, Vol. 2, No. 1 (2000), pp. 5-
22; see also S. Graham and D. Wood, “Digitizing surveillance: Categorization, space, inequality”, 
Critical Social Policy, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2003), pp. 227-48; and D. Lyon, “Globalizing Surveillance: 
Comparative and Sociological Perspectives”, International Sociology, Vol. 19, No. 2 (2004), pp. 135-49; 
and P. Bonditti, “From Territorial Space to Networks: A Foucaldian Approach to the Implementation of 
Biometry”, Alternatives, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2004), pp. 465-82. 
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of equivalent provisions in the human rights realm, significantly weakens the position of those 
facing the social control apparatus. 
This vulnerability is further reinforced by the vanishing of previous temporal and spatial limits. 
Risk-based social control is potentially boundless in that it can vary from a definite post-offence 
time to a vague ante risk-behaviour period and from a clear-cut space of illegality to a field of 
action liable to cover an undetermined part of private life. Eventually, its changing relation with 
time and space alters its relation with reality insofar as it focuses on potential rather than real 
behaviours. Thus its effects are produced not only because of its links with reality but also 
through its projection onto a virtual reality. Far from limiting themselves to the containment of 
offenders, social control agents seek to control undisciplined persons by managing in advance 
risk-producing groups, the behaviour of whom is monitored thanks to a series of speculations on 
their future manifestation.
42 The agents abandon their previous reactive patterns, circumscribed 
by the spatial–temporal choices and other specificities of the offenders, and adopt a proactive 
approach, i.e. active and free from earlier constraints, allowing them to become the quasi-
absolute definers of both the spatial–temporal parameters and the modes of their intervention, 
regardless of the acts effectively perpetrated by the persons in question. In so doing, they escape 
from the restrictions posed by the unending changeability of the present reality and are able to 
base their decisions on a more easy-to-mould future, following numerous scenarios that end up 
colonising the future.
43 Instead of being mere suppositions, hazardously inscribed in reality, 
these scenarios embody a part of reality
44 insofar as they effectively transform the future, which 
is thereafter seen as the cause rather than the effect of present acts. 
2.3  Coping with the threat at the EU level 
In the case of football hooliganism, this rise of the risk-focused crime control policy remains 
essentially limited at the national and European levels. That is shown by both the late adoption 
of the risk-based principles of action by the EU institutions and the attachment of European 
deputies to the rehabilitation-oriented crime control policy. In the former case, it should be 
specified that, in the absence of any legal grounds empowering them to directly regulate sports 
issues,
45 EU institutions have long opted for indirect ways of action that do not allow us to 
discern their conceptual background.
46 The influence of the risk-based mentality first became 
obvious in the Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and 
restraining disorder connected with football matches. It recommends the establishment of an 
overall assessment of the potential for disorder and the standardisation of the exchange of 
intelligence about known or suspected groups of troublemakers.
47 One year later, the Council 
Resolution of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining football hooliganism through the 
                                                 
42 See D. Bigo, “Globalized (in)security: The Field and the Ban-opticon”, in D. Bigo and A. Tsoukala 
(eds), Illiberal Practices of Liberal Regimes: The (in)security games, Paris: L’Harmattan (2006), pp. 5-
49. 
43 See U. Beck, World Risk Society, Cambridge: Polity Press (1999), p. 52; see also by the same author, 
“The Terrorist Threat: World Risk Society Revisited”, Theory, Culture & Society, Vol. 19, No. 4 (2002), 
p. 40. 
44 See U. Beck (1999), op. cit., p. 139. 
45 Apart from a declaration on sport annexed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, without binding effect, there is 
no specific reference to sport in the Treaties.  
46 See, for instance the Adonnino Report, adopted by the Milan European Council in June 1985, which 
recommended the reinforcement of preventive and coercive counter-hooliganism measures (Resolution of 
13 November 1985, Europe of the citizens, OJ C 345, 31.12.1985). 
47 Refer to European Council, Recommendation of 22 April 1996 on guidelines for preventing and 
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exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy confirmed this position by 
recommending that football bans imposed upon known and suspected troublemakers should also 
apply to football matches in a European context.
48 This Council Resolution also offers a good 
illustration of the increasing influence of the risk-based mentality, which has moved beyond the 
institutionalisation of the control of deviance to alter the very reasoning of the decision-makers. 
Indeed, in spite of the absence of any evidence on the existence of an international network of 
hooligans, the European-wide diffusion of the belief in deterritorialised threats, rising from 
internationally connected criminal networks, pushed its authors to ask for the annual 
compilation of national reports on the activities of international networks of football supporters’ 
groups.
49 
Yet, this position of the European Council is not shared by the European Parliament, which 
remains attached to the principles of the rehabilitation-oriented crime control policy. This 
priority is clearly shown in the Resolution of 11 July 1985,
50 adopted right after the Heysel 
stadium disaster. While they complied with some of the policies provided by the 1985 European 
Convention, in also recommending the reinforcement of the coercive and situational preventive 
measures,
51 European deputies diverged significantly when they specified that security measures 
should only be applied to known troublemakers.
52 The former also differed with the Convention 
when they aspired to the elaboration of a long-term preventive policy able to combat the social 
and political causes of the phenomenon.
53 In other words, while they shared the view that the 
efficient tackling of football hooliganism requires the strengthening of relevant security policies, 
they rejected any institutionalisation of the control of deviance and refused to dissociate the 
phenomenon from its social context. This position was further confirmed in the Resolution of 22 
January 1988. On the one hand, in this Resolution the recommended enhancement of 
international police cooperation and the establishment of a European-wide network for 
collecting and exchanging intelligence are not meant to cover suspected troublemakers. On the 
other hand, football hooliganism is associated with numerous economic, political and social 
factors, such as the fuelling of nationalism and xenophobia by the mass media and the influence 
of far-right political organisations.
54 This strikingly broad definition of football hooliganism
55 is 
also interesting for the prioritisation of the social values that it implies. Being thus opposed to 
the Council of Europe and to the European Council, the European Parliament has stood as the 
sole European institution showing concern and proposing appropriate measures for the 
                                                 
48 Refer to European Council, Resolution of 9 June 1997 of 9 June 1997 on preventing and restraining 
football hooliganism through the exchange of experience, exclusion from stadiums and media policy, OJ 
C 193, 24.6.1997, §1. 
49 Idem, §2. 
50 Refer to European Parliament, Resolution of 11 July 1985 on the measures needed to combat vandalism 
and violence in sport, OJ C 229, 9.9.1985. 
51 Idem, §1-3. 
52 Ibid., §3e.  
53 Ibid., C, §7, 10, 11. 
54 Refer to European Parliament, Resolution of 22 January 1988 on vandalism and violence in sport, OJ 
C49, 22.2.1988, Preamble (E, G). 
55 While the authors of the 1985 European Convention admitted that the origins of football spectator 
violence were mainly outside sport, the only long-term preventive policy they proposed was sports-
focused, i.e. relying primarily on the promotion of the sporting ideal and of the notion of fair play. 
Moreover, in its first annual report, the Standing Committee considered that research into the social 
origins of football hooliganism could not be directly helpful in implementing the European Convention 
(First meeting of the Standing Committee, Meeting Report 4, 8-9 July 1986, mentioned by J. Taylor 
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protection of both public and democratic order in the EU countries.
56 Expressed also in 1990 in 
the report of the Committee of Inquiry into racism and xenophobia,
57 in 1994, in the Resolution 
on the EU and sport,
58 and in 1996, in the report on football hooliganism and on the freedom of 
movement of football supporters,
59 this stance favouring the protection of democratic principles 
and the rule of law has led to the constant denouncing of racism in football stadia. This position 
has also led to growing concerns about the arrests and deportations of football supporters on the 
basis of mere presumptions, and to confirmation of the principle that the security dispositif 
should not cover suspected troublemakers. 
3. Normative  vagueness 
European deputies have continually sought to strike a balance between the principles of the risk-
focused crime control policy and the protection of fundamental rights throughout the subsequent 
period, ranging from the late 1990s to today. Expressed in 2000,
60 this position was thoroughly 
developed during the debates held in the course of the sitting of 8 April 2002 on the draft 
Council decision on security in connection with football matches with an international 
dimension, which mainly provided for the creation of an EU-wide network of collection and 
exchange of intelligence on football hooliganism. Actually, while some European deputies have 
supported the introduction of proactive policing measures and have not called into question the 
creation of such a broad surveillance dispositif, others have denounced the ensuing 
establishment of the control of deviant behaviour, if that dispositif covers suspected 
troublemakers as well. The latter have called for the implementation of a long-term preventive 
policy able to combat both social and sports-related causes of the phenomenon.
61 
Nevertheless, this position of the European Parliament remains quite marginal at the EU level. 
The European Council has diverged significantly from it. More specifically, while the European 
Council fully shares the principles of the risk-focused crime control policy they have also 
moved on to a new stage of defining football hooliganism, which is characterised by a growing 
normative vagueness. The turning point was arguably the Joint Action with regard to 
cooperation on law and order and security, adopted in 26 May 1997.
62 That Joint Action, which 
passed through without prior consultation of the European Parliament,
63 extends the provisions 
of the aforementioned Council Recommendation of 22 April 1996 to cover public order issues 
in general including sports events. It mainly provides for the collection, analysis and exchange 
of information on all sizeable groups that may pose a threat to law, order and security when 
                                                 
56 Refer to the European Parliament’s Resolution on vandalism and violence in sport (1988), op. cit., §6, 
15. 
57 See European Parliament, OJ C 284, 12.11.1990. 
58 See the Report on football hooliganism and on the freedom of movement of football supporters, cited in 
European Parliament, OJ C 205, 25.7.1994. 
59 See also the Report on football hooliganism and on the freedom of movement of football supporters, 
Doc. A4-0124/96 as cited in European Parliament, OJ C 166, 10.06.1996. For an analysis of the European 
Parliament’s debates on this issue, see A. Tsoukala, « Les organes communautaires et la violence dans le 
sport », 1
st Congress of the French Association of Sociology, Villetaneuse, 24-27 February 2004. 
60 Refer to European Parliament, Resolution on Euro 2000, OJ C 121, 24.4.2001.  
61 See A. Tsoukala (2004b), op. cit. 
62 Refer to European Council, Joint Action of 26 May 1997 adopted by the Council on the basis of Article 
K.3 of the Treaty on European Union with regard to cooperation on law and order and security, OJ L 147, 
5.6.1997.  
63 See Statewatch, “The ‘enemy within’: EU plans the surveillance of protestors and the criminalisation of 
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travelling to another member state to participate in a meeting attended by large numbers of 
persons from more than one member state.
64 For this purpose, it stipulates that the cooperation 
between law enforcement agencies should be further reinforced by the creation of an EU-wide 
pool of liaison officers.
65  
The major change induced by the Joint Action lies in the introduction of the term “meeting”, 
which refers to a whole array of events, ranging from sporting events to rock concerts, 
demonstrations and road-blocking protest campaigns. Thereafter, while football hooliganism 
has remained part of the broader set of threats posed to the internal security of EU countries, in 
line with the previously established global perception of security threats, it has simultaneously 
been included in a sub-group of threats where, in line with the principles of the risk-focused 
mentality, it is linked to ordinary but potentially threatening collective behaviours. This dual 
inscription of the phenomenon in different conceptual registers reveals a deep change in its 
definitional process. The hard core of the behaviour remains clearly circumscribed in the 
criminal justice field but its contour has become increasingly vague, precisely because of its 
simultaneous inscription in two distinct frames of reference. The effects of this definitional 
vagueness have moved beyond those observed in the previous period: now, the potentially 
interconnected behaviours are no longer situated on the borderline between delinquency and 
deviance but on that between deviance and ordinary behaviour. Their common point is no 
longer the potential or effective transgression of the norms but their mere propensity to create 
disorder, even if, formally speaking, they are norm-abiding. The definition of the behaviours to 
be put under control is thus enlarged, once again, to include ordinary behaviours, situated 
beyond the limits posed by both legal and social norms. 
The specificity of the definitional contour of football hooliganism was further weakened 
following the JHA Council meeting of 13 July 2001, concerning security at meetings of the 
European Council and other comparable events. The conclusions of that meeting
66 provide 
mainly for the creation of an EU-wide network of national databases, for the establishment of a 
pool of liaison officers and for the broader implementation of a measure until then reserved for 
football hooligans, i.e. the systematic use of spotters.
67 Bringing together football hooliganism 
and demonstrations was one of the key features of the aforementioned Joint Action. Yet, within 
the Council’s conclusions it had acquired a new dimension through the decoupling of these 
events from the other high-risk behaviours mentioned by that Joint Action. The association thus 
established between political and sports events gives rise to the issue of whether individuals 
                                                 
64 Refer to the European Council’s Joint Action (1997), op. cit., Preamble and Art. 1§1. In the European 
Council Resolution of 29 April 2004 on security at European meetings and other comparable events (OJ 
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respect of whom there are substantial grounds for believing that they intend to enter the member state 
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65 Refer to the European Council’s Joint Action (1997), op. cit., Art. 2§1. The operational details of this 
cooperation were specified in the European Council Resolution of 21 June 1999 concerning a handbook 
for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and disturbances in 
connection with international football matches, OJ C 196, 13.7.1999. Later on, that Council Resolution 
was updated and expanded by the Council Resolution of 6 December 2001 concerning a handbook with 
recommendations for international police cooperation and measures to prevent and control violence and 
disturbances in connection with football matches with an international dimension, in which at least one 
member state is involved, OJ C 22, 24.1.2002. 
66 Although these conclusions have no binding effect, member states are expected to abide by them. 
67 Refer to European Council, Conclusions adopted by the Council and the representatives of the 
Governments of the Member States on 13 July 2001 on security at meetings of the European Council and 
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wishing to go to another member state to protest should be prevented from leaving their 
country,
68 following mutatis  mutandis the football bans principle. At the same time, the 
establishment of such an association did not prevent the further connection of football 
hooliganism with other high-risk behaviours. Indeed, during the aforementioned JHA Council 
meeting, the issue was raised as to whether it was appropriate to extend the powers of Europol 
to cover violent disturbances, offences and groups.
69  
It is now clear that while football hooliganism is part of a broad set of security threats and a sub-
group of threats related to potentially dangerous collective behaviours, it is also part of another 
sub-group of threats, related to urban security, which places it next to urban riots, petty crime, 
juvenile delinquency and demonstrations. This inscription of the phenomenon in another 
conceptual register intensifies the fragmentation of its contour, henceforth multi-positioned in 
various categories of threats, but also significantly enlarges the origin of the mobilisation of the 
social control apparatus. Being turned into a floating concept moving around a hard core of 
reprehensible behaviours, subject to de facto circumscriptions but not to any legal definition, 
football hooliganism borrows some of the features of the behaviours it is associated with 
according to the prevailing classification in any given context. Each one of these classifications 
justifies, in turn, the implementation of (dis)similar security measures, believed to be able to 
cope with one or more specific aspects of the phenomenon. 
These multiple classifications are presently grouped under the term ‘conflict’. In a preliminary 
note for an experts’ JHA Council meeting in 1998,
70 conflict is defined as any act contrary to 
the public’s perception of normality or which adversely affects their quality of life.
71 
Consequently, it includes both crime and disorder.
72 The ensuing blurring of the frontiers 
between delinquency, deviance and ordinary behaviour does not rest upon a legal concept 
whatsoever but upon an essentially political one, as it is specified that conflict has the potential 
to have an adverse effect on the status quo.
73 This restrictive definition of conflict, which 
focuses on its potential for disorder and destruction but disregards its contribution to the renewal 
of social life, congregates a broad set of behaviours to be put under control following the 
implementation of anticipatory patterns of action that aim at identifying and controlling tensions 
in society.
74 The gradual substitution of the legal term offence for the political one conflict, as a 
source of the mobilisation of the social control apparatus, was further confirmed by the Council 
Decision of 28 May 2001 on setting up a European crime-prevention network.
75 Actually, the 
authors of the Decision did not adopt the definition advanced by the European Commission in 
its proposal for a Council decision. More specifically, according to the Commission the concept 
of crime could also cover anti-social conduct, which, without necessarily being a criminal 
                                                 
68 Idem, 3a. 
69 Ibid., 1e.  
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in Brussels on 15 April 1998”, Statewatch, London (1998) (http://www.statewatch.org).  
71 Refer to European Council, Note from the Presidency to the Cooperation Group (experts on public 
order), 7386/98 ENFOPOL 45, 3.4.1998, 3.1. 
72 Idem. 
73 Ibid., 3.2. 
74 Ibid., 3.3. 
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offence, by its cumulative effect could generate a climate of tension and insecurity.
76 Yet, the 
European Council’s Decision did not put aside the political element in its definition of the 
behaviours to be put under control since it considers that crime prevention should intend to 
reduce or otherwise contribute to reducing crime and citizens’ feelings of insecurity.
77 
It follows that the framing of behaviour such as football hooliganism is recomposed around a 
hard core of legal and political concepts, which justify its control in the name of the protection 
of both public and political order. Since the feeling of insecurity is closely related to a series of 
social, political and economic factors, which cannot be dissociated from numerous political 
stakes, the reasons that can mobilise the social control apparatus are henceforth potentially 
infinite. Yet, however practical it may seem to law enforcement agents, this framing makes 
football hooliganism simultaneously totally controllable and uncontrollable. Actually, while the 
conceptual multi-positioning of the phenomenon exponentially enhances the possibilities and 
modes of intervention of the social control apparatus, it also amplifies the dimensions of 
football hooliganism in that it turns it into a boundless problem, a multiform security threat 
eventually escaping from all control.  
If the establishment of football information points in every member state for exchanging 
information and facilitating international police cooperation in connection with football matches 
(provided by the Council Decision of 25 April 2002)
78 thus seems a necessary measure to cope 
with such a threat, simultaneously it falls short of the scope of football hooliganism. Such a 
measure represents a temporary stage of a future control dispositif, always thought to be better 
suited to fit in with the specificities of the threat. It should be noted that this continual 
strengthening of the counter-hooliganism security dispositif does not always imply the 
reinforcement of the control of deviance. While the Council Resolution of 17 November 2003 
on member states’ use of bans on access to football match venues with an international 
dimension
79 invites member states to examine the possibility of introducing 
domestic/international football bans, it specifies that this provision should only apply to persons 
previously guilty of violent conduct at football matches.
80 By contrast, Council Decision 
2006/…/JHA amending Decision 2002/348/JHA concerning security in connection with 
football matches with an international dimension
81 empowers national football information 
points to collect and exchange personal data not only on high-risk supporters, as provided by 
Decision 2002/348/JHA, but also on those associated with lower risk.
82 The subsequent 
expansion of the control of deviance is further confirmed by the call to national football 
information points to produce and diffuse regular generic or thematic national assessments of 
football.
83 
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One of the most important effects of the diffusion of this expanding risk-focused mentality at 
the national level is the transformation of football bans into ordinary tools of risk management. 
Football bans that during the previous period were usually imposed by a court on conviction are 
now increasingly applied to suspected troublemakers as well. The limited scope of this paper 
does not allow an in-depth analysis of the legal questions raised by this trend. Therefore, the 
subsequent confusion between the executive and judiciary powers and the issues associated with 
the violation of the presumption of innocence, the principle of proportionality and the freedom 
of movement within the EU are not discussed here. Nevertheless, this shortcoming should not 
draw our attention away from the fact that the present systematic use of international football 
bans has led to a de facto institutionalisation of the re-establishment of border controls in the 
Schengen area. Actually, the re-introduction of border controls on the basis of Art. 2.2 of the 
Schengen Convention
84 has been a common practice of member states since the late 1990s.
85 In 
2001, the European Parliament was already drawing attention to the infringement of 
fundamental rights through the transformation of an exceptional provision into a general rule at 
the disposal of governments whenever they feared crowd disorder, even for international events 
of minor importance.
86 Still, formally speaking, member states that host international events in 
which crowd disorder is deemed likely may always take other steps to protect security and 
public order without applying border controls. This flexible decision-making process has totally 
vanished in the case of football hooliganism, however, as the efficient application of 
international football bans requires, by definition, the re-establishment of border controls during 
international tournaments.  
Concluding remarks 
This brief analysis of the regulation of football hooliganism in Europe and its evolution since 
the late 1960s has enabled us to see how the politicisation of security and the growing influence 
of a risk-based mentality on the conception and implementation of crime control policies have 
led to the infringement of football supporters’ civil rights and liberties. The cause of this 
infringement is the institutionalisation of the control of deviance and the blurring of the frontiers 
between the executive and legislative powers.  
In this respect, counter-hooliganism policies can be seen as a fine illustration of the prevailing 
changes and trends in crime control patterns. Nevertheless, that should not prevent us from 
noting a major difference between the social reactions to security policies in general and to 
counter-hooliganism ones in particular. While in the former case infringement of the civil rights 
and liberties of members of certain social groups has always provoked vivid criticism by many 
politicians and numerous human rights groups, the infringement of football supporters’ civil 
rights and liberties has usually been met with indifference.
87 The reasons underlying this 
selective defence of human rights may arguably be linked to one or a combination of factors 
                                                 
84 Art. 2.2 of the Schengen Convention provides that where public policy or national security so require, a 
Contracting Party may decide that for a limited period national border checks appropriate to the situation 
shall be carried out at internal borders. 
85 For an analysis of this issue, see J. Apap and S. Carrera, Maintaining Security within Borders: Towards 
a Permanent State of Emergency in the EU?, Policy Brief No. 41, CEPS, Brussels (2003). 
86 Refer to European Parliament, Recommendation to the Council on an area of freedom, security and 
justice: Security at meetings of the European Council and other comparable events, 5.1, Doc. A5-
0396/2001, 12 December (2001).  
87 An exception is found in British civil society, which has occasionally criticised the violation of football 
fans’ fundamental rights. See, for instance, Liberty, Briefing on the draft Football (Disorder) Bill, 
Liberty, London, July (2000); see also Statewatch, “Public order policing in Europe – Policy backlash 
expected”, Statewatch, London June (2001) (http://www.statewatch.org). SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN EUROPEAN FOOTBALL STADIA | 17 
including the low opinion of many intellectuals on football and football supporters, the 
longstanding and eventually successful process of constructing the threatening ‘football 
hooligan’ figure and a lack of organisation among the ranks of football supporters. In any case, 
this silence remains deeply worrying in that its effects go well beyond the reinforcement of the 
football supporters’ vulnerability in front of the social control apparatus to highlight the very 
limits of the actions undertaken by human rights groups in EU countries.   
Yet, however difficult it may be to overcome both the present trends in crime control policies 
and the broad lack of civil reaction to the infringement of football supporters’ civil rights and 
liberties, the return to a rule-of-law-abiding counter-hooliganism policy is always possible. For 
this purpose, the security dispositif should rely on an EU-wide legal definition of the 
phenomenon to target only known football hooligans and to prevent any de facto extension of 
their punishment beyond the formal limits of their initial sanction.
88 To enhance their efficiency, 
counter-hooliganism policies should further rest upon an array of measures other than the 
coercive and proactive ones. That should imply, for instance, the strengthening of ticket 
controls, the introduction of the principle of negotiation between law enforcement agents and 
the leaders of the football supporters’ groups in accordance with the predominant patterns of 
policing mass demonstrations and the ensuing development of self-regulatory modes within the 
football supporters’ ranks. 
 
 
                                                 
88 Presently, data on persons subject to football bans are usually retained for five years. Hence, during that 
period, both known and suspected troublemakers may be prevented from travelling abroad to attend an 
international tournament, even if they had been subject to a significantly shorter ban.  18 | 
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